2 surrounding it. The chapter will move on to consider EU policy on capabilities enhancement in the Western Balkans as part of the development of regional cooperation with a view to EU accession. Once legal competence is established in this context, the purpose then is to evaluate the political competency of the EU to influence public policy in the field of criminal justice. We will also attempt to identify actual and potential stumbling blocks in the transmission of EU rules and norms to neighbouring states. The time is ripe since the first forms of EU criminal law post-Lisbon Treaty have been enacted and a new constitutional dimension has attached to this field an external dimension which is worth observing.
<a>2 EU CRIMINAL JUSTICE AS AN EXTERNAL POLICY
The AFSJ was originally conceived almost 15 years ago as an internal project which was concerned with establishing an area without frontiers with an integrated management system. This system is unique in that not only does it constitute a means of rights enhancement by offering more 'Freedom' to EU citizens but it also contains elements of rights restriction in order for the EU to establish more 'Security' across its borders. As such, the AFSJ concerns both the movement of persons across the European 'Area' through developing a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control as well as restrictions upon their liberties through criminal law. This chapter will focus on the latter, i.e., what we commonly refer to post-Lisbon as EU criminal law which carries with it new institutional dynamics and legal instruments that have only been fully effective since December 2014. As explained in previous chapters of this volume, the Lisbon Treaty's criminal law acquis is based on mutual recognition in criminal matters and the possibility of law-making of a procedural nature. Indeed, the areas of EU activity in the field of criminal law have proliferated from measures addressing corruption and money laundering to organized crime and terrorism. These areas have received particular attention in various political pronouncements as crucial to establishing stability, security and accountability within the EU. 2 However, since transnational crime cannot be contained within Europe alone, most of these areas of EU activity carry a growing external dimension and demand international cooperation in order to be carried out more effectively. Yet, despite consensus between Member States that the EU must be able to become a global actor by developing resilience to respond to transnational crime, 3 11 See e.g., the EU-Ukraine Treaty. 12 Borrowing from Hillion, De Baere calls these agreements 'proto cross-pillar' because at the time PCAs were concluded, the EU did not have legal personality to enter into treaties (they were concluded on behalf of the EC). Yet again PCAs provided a model for bridging cross-pillar objectives such as promoting trade and combating crime. Post-Lisbon, cross-pillar mixed agreements declined because all international agreements are now signed by the EU. Still, however, a certain fuzziness is maintained in lieu of the retention of CFSP in the TEU and thus its firm separation from the rest of the TFEU policy areas. See G. 24 According to Paul Mahoney, UK judge at the ECtHR, Art. 6 ECHR provides procedural protection once 'a "criminal charge" is brought against an individual; and it remains in place until the charge is "determined", that is until the sentence has been fixed or an appeal decided'. P. In the past five years only, the ECtHR has ruled against Russia on numerous occasions concerning the rights of the defence in criminal proceedings in relation to ineffective legal assistance during appeal proceedings, 27 violation of the ne bis in idem principle, 28 and excessive use and duration of pre-trial detention and custody, 29 to name but a few ECHR breaches. 30 For some of these cases, the Strasbourg Court has utilized the pilot judgment procedure to deal with repetitive applications arising from the same recurrent issue at the domestic level. 31 The role of the ECtHR is, therefore, significant in compelling the Russian authorities to address human rights breaches also condemned by the EU and to help enhance the EU-Russia partnership through the penetration of a European dimension into Russia's domestic discourse. i.e., offering, inter alia, a relaxed visa regime through facilitation and readmission schemes.
As bilateral agreements, SAAs are different to PCAs, discussed in the context of the EU-Russia relationship. Not only are they legally binding but they are also based upon a strong conditionality approach which suggests approximation to EU rules. They also promote strong neighbourly relations and regional cooperation (for example, through addressing common threats in connection with organized crime activities and integrated border management). Furthermore, the EU has established Roadmaps on corruption and cross-border police cooperation, as well as financial and human resources support for institutional and capacity building (e.g., through creating appropriate units in ministries or the police and setting up counter-money laundering offices). Notwithstanding these rule of law sector-strengthening efforts, crime and corruption is seen as deeply entrenched in the politics of Western Balkan states, sometimes with strong links to organized crime groups. This means that although police authorities are able to arrest suspects based on evidence, the judicial system has, more often than not, abstained from prosecuting. 34 Even when prosecution takes place, the level of sentencing in organized crime cases remains relatively low. 35 36 Although we will avoid making generalizations, especially due to the somewhat patchy implementation of the EAW in the existing Member States, there is evidence that crime, corruption and tax evasion cost Croatia billions of Euros. 37 The story of Croatia, which was considered advanced enough to undergo a process of Stabilisation and Association, shows that EU enlargement conditionality has not succeeded in raising criminal law standards in the country. The recurrent issue, also prominent in the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, which are facing similar problems of unruliness, is that EU enlargement places more emphasis on transplanting the EU's concrete model of market economy than its abstract commitment to the rule of law. As such, addressing short-term security and justice priorities appears to constitute enough evidence for the EU to give a candidate state the green light vis-à-vis the fulfilment of its European perspective. Of course, this approach is not sustainable in the medium-to-long term and has negative repercussions in achieving the external criminal objectives of the AFSJ.
<a>4 CONCLUSION: COMPETENCE OR COMPETENCY?
The aim of the EU to keep Russia close and integrate the Western Balkans region, and to make this a priority, is an ambitious project in EU external relations. As far as international cooperation in criminal matters is concerned, the level of partnership or integration that can be achieved between the parties is conditional upon EU competence to conclude agreements with third parties that create binding legal obligations and EU pre-accession strategy. Indeed, some progress has been made in EU bilateral relations and both the EU and its partner states seem to have embraced a European perspective in dealing with transnational crime. However, any future plans to provide a solid legal basis for EU AFSJ partnerships seems to be constrained by the Treaty's lack of express external competence in criminal law and the somewhat loose commitments generated by the EU's pre-accession strategy. The sometimes equivocal EU-Russia relations and the lack of credibility of EU conditionality manifested in the EU-Western Balkans SAAs provides a good testing ground for the future of EU international cooperation in criminal law.
With reference to Russia, although negotiations on a new agreement to replace the current PCA started in 2008, the establishment of a sound and legally binding bilateral framework between the EU and Russia to cover criminal aspects raises questions vis-à-vis the principle of conferral of powers. In particular, the ambition to deepen EU-Russia relations on criminal law has exposed a legal competence gap that cannot be filled unless the current Treaties are revised or Russia is willing to tighten up its ties to the EU by entering into a SAA. However, as seen in the context of the Western Balkan states, SAAs are 'pre-association' agreements subjecting states to policy-related conditionality in return for a remote accession possibility. The recent EU-
Russia tensions over Ukraine demonstrate that the SAA model is unappealing to Russia, which appears to be a rival suitor to the EU. Current evidence demonstrates that not only does Russia wish to maintain its sphere of influence but it also aspires to retain its customs union (the Eurasian Economic Community) by steering neighbouring states away from the EU. 38 As such, it is more likely that any new EU-Russia Agreement would be in line with the parties' geostrategic interests and only go as far as to cover trade, investment and energy.
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On the other side of the spectrum, modernization and adjustment to the advanced European models is highly challenging for the Western Balkan states.
Although the EU is competent through SAAs to enter into legally binding obligations that in theory provide for adjustments in criminal law, in practice, it seems somewhat cumbersome for the EU to force progress and secure harmonized standards in the region. This is even more so given the EU's ill-designed approach to Western Balkan states' accession negotiations characterized by a lack of concrete benchmarks and a faroff accession perspective. The latter has added to the transition economies' lethargic approach and to an overall 'enlargement fatigue'. 40 As it is expected, doubts over the prospects of EU membership have generated little political motivation in the associated states to move quickly and invest money and effort to build functional and sustainable constitutional and institutional reforms. Europe, but it also makes adherence to the EU rule of law a necessity in the conduct of EU international cooperation with third countries.
For as long as the above legal and political frictions stand between the EU and its partners, the EU may have or acquire the legal competence, but would still be lacking the political competency, to consistently achieve or exceed its external goals.
